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Hydraulic fracturing has become a contentious issue around the globe. In the present study, using 
a sample of American adults (n=412), the role of political orientation (conservative vs. liberal) 
and basic knowledge about fracking on fracking risk perception attitudes, fracking economic 
attitudes, energy reliance attitudes, trust of energy information sources, and preferred dwelling 
distance from energy operations was investigated. Basic knowledge about hydraulic fracturing as 
a possible moderating mechanism was also explored. Correlational and regression results 
revealed that political ideology and basic fracking knowledge are key predictors of fracking and 
energy source attitudes, and that the nature of the relation between ideology and fracking risk 
perceptions, fracking economic attitudes, reliance on natural gas, wind and solar, and distrust of 
government agencies, are influenced by an individual’s basic knowledge about fracking.  
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1. Introduction  
Policies on, and attitudes toward, gas and oil hydraulic fracturing (or fracking) vary 
considerably from place to place, and person to person (‘hydraulic fracturing’ and ‘fracking’ are 
used interchangeably). On May 15, 2015, for example, Governor Greg Abbot of Texas signed a 
law prohibiting cities from banning fracking within their boundaries (Malewitz, 2015), arguing 
that it will help protect private property as well as economic recovery. The states of Maryland 
and New York, in contrast, have banned fracking (Cama, 2015; Kaplan, 2014), citing 
environmental and health risks. Germany does not allow fracking within its territory, due to its 
potential environmental and health risks; the United Kingdom government—highlighting the 
potential economic benefits of fracking—has lifted a ban on fracking (Smith-Spark & Boulden, 
2013; Tost, 2014). With high economic, health, and environmental stakes documented by the 
opposing sides (see Kester et al., 2015), fracking has become one of the most contentious 
environmental issues around the globe. Referring to one step in the process of drilling for natural 
gas from shale rock, hydraulic fracturing involves injecting high-pressure water, sand, and other 
chemicals into the rock to ‘fracture’ it and release natural gas (or shale gas). According to the 
Environmental and Energy Study Institute, there are two main types of fracking or drilling 
techniques: Vertical and horizontal. Vertical, or conventional fracking techniques, refers to in-
depth drilling. Horizontal fracking or drilling, representing a more recent technique, allows 
drilling to take place laterally. While horizontal fracking covers a larger territory by conducting 
high volume fracking, it also uses “70 to 300 times more fluid than previous methods” (see e.g., 
Considine et al., 2010; EIA, 2012). Although fracking has been used since the late 1940s, its 
prevalence around the globe has risen dramatically with drilling sites being constructed 
increasingly closer to people’s dwellings (see Adgate, Goldstein, & McKenzie, 2014; E.I.A., 




2015; Gold & McGinty, 2013; Witter, McKenzie, Stinson, Scott, Newman, & Adgate, 2013). 
These changes in fracking prevalence, proximity, and technology have prompted research on 
fracking outcomes and public opinion of fracking.  
Mirroring this polarity of consequences, public opinion is also mixed, with some 
researchers noting an ideological divide (see Kester et al., 2015). What affects public opinion 
about fracking, however, is largely unknown. For example, it is possible that political 
conservatives and liberals possess different degrees of knowledge about fracking (as they do, for 
example, about health care, Gross et al., 2013) or hold divergent risk perspectives on the 
practice. Further, knowledge about fracking might also affect the influence of political ideology 
on attitudes. To address these important questions, we investigated the relations between political 
ideology and basic knowledge about fracking with: Fracking attitudes, trust in authorities, and 
preferences for reliance on and desired dwelling distance from various energy sources.  
1.1 Benefits and drawbacks of hydraulic fracturing and other energy sources 
 Harvesting unconventional oil and natural gas (UNC) comprises several steps from well-
development to production. Hydraulic fracturing is one step in this larger process. Recently, in 
an extensive review of over 100 studies published in the last decade, Sovacool (2014) identified 
the main benefits and drawbacks of hydraulic fracturing. In his review he noted that hydraulic 
fracturing used to extract shale gas is associated with many negative outcomes including high 
financial costs to operate, accidents and leakage, negative environmental impact such as water, 
air, and radiation pollution that affect peoples’ health and climate change, reducing reliance on 
renewable energy sources because of shale gas’ comparatively low cost, inciting resistance from 
a concerned public, heightening risk of earthquakes, and economic instability because of a 
multitude of factors (e.g., substantial production costs for quickly depleting wells, etc.). Shale 




gas, however, also offers energy supply security, is less costly to produce and cheaper for 
consumers, has less of a negative impact on the environment than oil and coal, and presents 
several economic benefits (e.g., jobs, taxes) (see Sovacool, 2014, Table 8 for a summary; for 
additional studies and reviews on the effects of hydraulic fracturing see Adgate et al., 2014; 
Bamberger & Oswald, 2012; Considine, Watson, & Blumsack, 2010; IHS, 2012; Rabinowitz et 
al., 2015; Webb et al., 2014; Witter et al., 2008). 
Other sources of energy—whether traditional or more recent—also have benefits and 
drawbacks. Coal and oil, for example, have large and diverse economic benefits (U.S National 
Mining Association, 2014), but have been criticized for posing serious health and environmental 
risks (Aneja, Isherwood, & Morgan, 2012; Fernandez-Narvarro et al., 2012; Hendryx, 2008, 
2013). Nuclear energy also has economic advantages (NEI, 2014), but many people remain 
concerned about its potential health and environmental costs, especially in the wake of the 
accident in Fukushima, Japan (Buttler, Parkhill, & Pidgeon, 2011). Renewable energy sources—
such as wind—do not have (at least at present) the economic benefits that oil or gas can offer 
(Adgate et al., 2014; Sovacool, 2014), but comparatively speaking, these methods confer reduced 
environmental and health risks (Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2010; Knopper 
et al., 2014; McCunney, Mundt, Colby, Dobie, Kaliskii, & Blais, 2014).   
 In summary, traditional and renewable energy sources pose benefits and drawbacks in 
terms of economic, social, health, and environmental impacts. While the present study focuses 
primarily on fracking, the relations between political ideology and attitudes towards other 
sources of energy are also examined.  
 
 




1.2 An ideological divide? Predicting attitudes toward energy sources  
Energy source attitudes are intimately connected to people’s politics (Boudet et al., 2014; 
Davis & Fisk, 2014; Karlstrom & Ryghaug, 2014; Kovacs, Eng, & Gordelier, 2010; O’Hara, 
Humphrey, Andersson, Jaspal, Nerlich, & Knight, 2014; see Kester et al., 2015 for a discussion). 
‘Politics’ encompasses people’s political ideologies (i.e., political attitudes and beliefs), political 
identification (i.e., politically liberal or political conservative), and party affiliation (e.g., 
Democrat, Republican, Independent). Fundamentally, political conservatives are resistant to 
social change, preferring tradition; in contrast, political liberals prefer social change (Jost, Nosek, 
& Gosling, 2008; Jost et al., 2003). These core ideological differences are evident in partisan 
divides related to energy sources in the U.S. According to a Pew Research Centre poll in 2011, 
for instance, 83% of liberal-leaning (vs. 53% of conservative-leaning) Americans favoured 
contributing more funding to research on alternative and newer sources of energy like wind, 
solar, and hydrogen. Conversely, 78% and 54% of conservative-leaning Americans (vs. 46% and 
30% of liberal-leaning Americans) favoured traditional sources of energy like mining and 
drilling, and nuclear power, respectively. Hence, consistent with core ideological differences, 
liberals are more likely to support comparatively novel, less familiar renewable energy sources, 
consistent with their inclination for social change. Conservatives, on the other hand, tend to be 
opposed to newer technologies, preferring conventional energy technologies, consistent with 
their inclination for the status quo.   
Public opinion on hydraulic fracturing is similarly apportioned along ideological lines. In 
a nationally representative sample, Boudet and colleagues (2014) noted that identifying as 
politically conservative (vs. liberal) predicted greater support for hydraulic fracturing. Davis and 
Fisk (2014) likewise found that identifying as Republican related to support of hydraulic 




fracturing. Further, a recent survey by the PEW Research Centre in November 2014 revealed that 
62% of Republicans (vs. 29% of Democrats) supported increased fracking. Thus, political 
liberals predominantly hold unfavourable attitudes toward fracking whereas conservatives’ 
attitudes are favourable (see also O’Hara, Humphrey, Andersson, Jaspal, Nerlich, & Knight, 
2014; and Kester et al., 2015 for a discussion). It is important to note that much of the research 
on politics and fracking attitudes has relied on single-item measures of support or opposition to 
fracking (e.g., Boudet et al., 2014) rather than comprehensive and nuanced indices of fracking 
attitudes, such as risk perceptions of fracking. Therefore, in the present research, we utilise a 
comprehensive multi-item measure of fracking attitudes.  
 Peoples’ energy source opinions are likely connected to information they have gathered, 
with some information being deemed trustworthy and other information untrustworthy. 
Assessments of trust are related to political ideology. Political conservatives have become less 
trusting of scientists over time, whereas liberals’ trust of scientists has remained constant 
(Gauchet, 2012). Trust of the government is dependent on who is in power; people are more 
likely to trust the government if the party they support is in power, but less likely if the party 
they do not support is in power (Keele, 2005). As an example, with respect to energy specific 
information, Michaud, Carlile, and Smith (2008) reported that Republicans were less likely than 
Democrats to believe that contact with raw petrol poses health risks, and less likely to believe 
environmental scientists claiming that drilling is risky; conversely, Democrats (vs. Republicans) 
were less likely to believe claims from the oil industry. These findings are aligned with earlier 
work showing that a key feature of political conservatism is a “…central importance of business 
and industry in society” (Kerlinger, 1984, p.17). One would expect, therefore, that conservatives 
would exhibit high trust in the industry, and diminished trust in government agencies and public 




institutions (universities); liberals, in contrast, should manifest counter trends: Exhibiting high 
trust of government and public institutions, and limited trust of industry.   
1.3 Risk perception 
One aspect of attitudes towards fracking is risk perception, that is, how risky one 
perceives hydraulic fracturing to be. Researchers (e.g., Hanoch, et al., 2006; Slovic, 1987) have 
argued that risk perception is a key factor in willingness to engage in a wide spectrum of 
behaviours. Investigators, for instance, have reported an inverse relation between risk perception 
and willingness to accept gene technology (Siegrist, 2000), vaccination (Brewer et al, 2007), sea-
food consumption (Jacobs, Sioen, Pieniak, Henauw, Maulvault, Reuver, et al., 2015), and 
travelling (Elias & Shiftan, 2012). More closely related to the present issue, researchers have 
also shown that risk perception is related to environmental and energy related matters: Visschers 
and Siegris (2013) noted that as risk perception increases willingness to accept nuclear power 
decreases; Leiserowitz (2006) argued that risk perception is associated with supporting efforts to 
reduce climate change; and Spence, Poortinga, and Pidgeon (2011) showed that higher risk 
perception of climate change leads to greater willingness to save energy.  
1.4 Knowledge 
 Public awareness campaigns are employed to educate the general public and garner 
public support. Some research has noted that greater familiarity with fracking is associated with 
less support for fracking (Boudet et al., 2014). However, earlier studies, such as the one by 
Boudet et al., used only self-reported familiarity with fracking (e.g., how much have you heard 
about fracking) rather than actually examining objective knowledge about fracking. Although 
awareness and knowledge may be connected, they are fundamentally different in important 
ways; for instance, being aware of fracking does not mean a person has an accurate 




comprehension of what it is. As such, the effect of increased knowledge for support of fracking 
is crucial, yet unknown.  
Whereas some research notes that increased knowledge can lead to more supportive 
attitudes of renewable energy technologies (Pierce et al., 2009), other research reveals that 
increased knowledge of solar, wind and wave energy, for example, leads to decreases in support 
for alternative energy sources (Burger et al., 2015). Of particular relevance, there is evidence that 
the effect of knowledge on partisan attitudes is influenced by political ideology. Using Gallup 
Poll data from 10 different countries, McCright and Dunlap (2011) found that for liberals, greater 
knowledge about climate change related to climate change belief and concern about the effects of 
climate change; for conservatives, however, greater knowledge related to climate change 
scepticism and lower concern about the effects of climate change (see also Hamilton, 2011). The 
present study is the first to investigate the relation between objective knowledge of fracking and 
attitudes, as well as whether knowledge moderates the relation between political ideology and 
fracking attitudes.  
1.5 The Present Research 
 The present study investigates the relation between political conservatism (vs. liberalism) 
and basic fracking knowledge with fracking and other-energy source attitudes, and the potential 
moderating function of basic fracking knowledge on the relations between political ideology and 
attitudes. First, we predict that political conservatism will be associated with more favourable 
(lower risk perception) attitudes towards hydraulic fracking (Hypothesis 1a), and that greater 
basic fracking knowledge will be associated with less favourable (higher risk perception) 
attitudes of hydraulic fracking (Hypothesis 1b). Second, we expect that political conservatism 
will relate to a desire to increase reliance on traditional energy sources like coal, fracking, and 




other natural gases and a desire to decrease reliance on renewable energy sources like wind, 
solar, and hydroelectric (Hypothesis 2a); in contrast, we expect that basic fracking knowledge 
will relate to a desire to decrease reliance on traditional energy sources, and a desire to increase 
reliance on renewable energy sources (Hypothesis 2b). Third, we predict that political 
conservatism (vs. liberalism) will relate to less trust of environmental organizations, consumer 
protection organizations, colleges and universities, and government agencies, and more trust of 
industry (Hypothesis 3a); whereas basic fracking knowledge will relate to more trust of 
environmental organizations, consumer protection organizations, colleges and universities, and 
government agencies, and less trust of industry (Hypothesis 3b). Fourth, we predict that political 
conservatism (vs. liberalism) will relate to greater willingness to live closer to a hydraulic 
fracking site, coal operations, and a nuclear power plant, and less willingness to live near wind 
turbines (Hypothesis 4a); conversely, we expect that greater basic fracking knowledge will relate 
to less willingness to live closer to a hydraulic fracking site, coal operations, and a nuclear power 
plant, and greater willingness to live near wind turbines (Hypothesis 4b). Finally, our hypotheses 
concerning the possible moderating effect of knowledge are necessarily more exploratory. We 
anticipate that should knowledge emerge as a moderator, it will serve to strengthen the proposed 
relations between political ideology and attitudes.  
2. Method 
2.1 Participants and Procedure 
 American participants (n=469) were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk, or MTurk 
(see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011); 57 participants did not provide information about 
their political orientation or demographics so were omitted from analyses leaving a final sample 
of 412. Participants recruited through MTurk are people who have registered with MTurk as a 




“worker” and can complete human intelligence tasks (HITs), including research studies (see 
Paolacci & Chandler, 2014 for a review). Several studies have confirmed that MTurk samples 
are more representative of the general population than undergraduate samples, and that MTurk 
samples are reliable, replicating established psychological, economic, and political science 
findings (e.g., Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013; Horton, 
Rand, & Zeckhauser, 2011; Klein et al., 2014; Mullinix, Druckman, & Freese, 2014; Paolacci et 
al., 2010).  
Participants were paid $0.50US (pay does not affect data quality, see Buhremester et al., 
2011). Participants ranged in age from 18 to 78 (Mage=35.72, SD=13.33; 46.8% women) and self-
identified as “liberal” (55.1%), “conservative” (19.7%), or “neither” (25.2%). Most had 
completed some college education (36.7%) or completed college degrees (38.1%; 0.2% less than 
high school; 13.3.1% completed high school; 9.5% master’s degree; 2.2% doctoral degree). The 
breakdown of annual incomes was as follows: 13.3% earned less than US$15,000, 27.9% earned 
US$15–30,000, 20.1% earned US$30–45000, 16.7% earned US$45–60,000, 9.2% earned 
US$60–75,000, and 12.6% earned over US$75,000. Demographic variables have shown to relate 
to fracking attitudes (see, e.g., Boudet et al., 2014); hence, age, gender, and income were 
considered as possible covariates. Participants completed measures of political ideology, basic 
fracking knowledge, fracking attitudes, energy use attitudes, preferred distance from energy 
sources, and trust in authorities.  
2.2 Measures 
 2.2.1 Political Ideology 
 To measure political ideology, participants responded to a single item: “We hear a lot of 
talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Where on the following scale of political 




orientation would you place yourself?” Participants responded on a continuum from 1-extremely 
liberal to 11-extremely conservative (see Jost, 2006). Higher scores indicated greater political 
conservatism.  
 2.2.2 Basic knowledge about fracking 
 To measure participants’ knowledge of the basic components of hydraulic fracking, a 
four item knowledge test was administered. The content of the test was based on information 
from sources including the UK government website, the UK Energy Research Centre, the Royal 
Academy of Engineering Report (2012), the U.S. government’s energy statistics agency 
(AEO2012 Early Release Overview), Energy and Commerce Committee, and the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA). The test required participants to select the correct definitions 
of shale gas (i.e., the name of the natural gas that is retrieved through hydraulic fracturing), 
hydraulic fracking (i.e., the process by which gas is extracted from rock beds underground using 
pressurized water, sand, and chemicals), unconventional gas (i.e., typically “free gas” trapped in 
various naturally occurring rock formations such as carbonates, sandstones, and siltstones), and 
fracking fluid (i.e., the fluid containing sand and chemicals that is pumped under pressure in 
order to dislodge gas from the rock beds). For each question there were four options. Scores were 
created by adding up the number of correct responses with higher scores indicating greater 
knowledge of the basic components of fracking. 
 2.2.3 Fracking Attitudes 
 To measure participants’ attitudes toward fracking, a 20-item scale was developed by the 
authors. The items were intended to assess risk perceptions associated with the relation between 
fracking and climate change and the environment, the financial impacts of fracking, government 
regulation preferences, and general perceptions of fracking as dangerous or safe. The items are 




listed in Table 1. Twelve of the items were written such that stronger agreement indicated more 
favourable (lower risk perception) attitudes toward fracking and 8 items were worded such that 
stronger agreement indicated less favourable (higher risk perception) attitudes toward fracking. 
Participants responded to each item on a scale from 1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree. 
Participants’ scores were created based on factor analysis results presented in the Results section 
and Table A.1. 
 2.2.4 Energy Use Attitudes 
 Participants responded to the question “Please tell me if you think the United States 
should increase, keep about the same, or decrease its use of each type of energy source” on a 
three-point scale: 1-increase, 2-keep the same, and 3-decrease. Participants indicated their 
responses for six energy sources: Coal, shale gas (fracking), wind power, solar power, 
hydroelectric power, and other natural gases. Higher scores indicated greater preference to 
decrease use of that energy source (see Krause, Carley, Warren, Rupp & Graham, 2014).  
  2.2.5 Distrust in Authorities 
 To measure trust in authorities, a measure from Krause et al. (2014) was modified. 
Participants indicated the degree to which they “would believe the information given to [them] 
about energy and environmental issues” from five sources: Environmental organizations, 
consumer protection organizations, industrial or trade organizations, colleges and universities, 
and government agencies. Participants responded on a scale from 1-completely/would not doubt 
to 4-do not believe them at all. Higher scores indicated greater distrust.  
2.2.6 Distance from Energy Sources 
 Participants responded to four items, developed by the authors. The items asked 
participants to “imagine that a hydraulic fracturing company [or wind power or energy company] 




has applied to drill [place a wind turbine/extract coal/build a nuclear power plant] near your 
home”, and indicate “at what distance from your home would you be willing for the hydraulic 
fracturing to take place [a wind turbine to be placed/coal mining to take place/a nuclear power 
plant to be placed]?” Participants responded on a 7-point scale: 1 (any distance), 2 (150 to 300 
yards), 3 (301 to 1500 yards), 4 (1 to 5 miles), 5 (6 to 15 miles), 6 (16 to 50 miles), 7 (unhappy at 
any distance). Lower scores indicated greater willingness to have that energy activities closer to 
their home.  
3. Results 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table A.2 shows the means and standard deviations of the study variables. (For details of 
the correlations between all of the study variables please contact the first author.) 
3.2 Fracking Attitudes: Scale Construction 
 A common factor analysis was conducted on the 20 items, applying an oblique rotation 
(promax, with kappa set to 4). Common factor analysis is an exploratory factor analysis 
technique in which the factor solution is based on estimates of shared variance among the items. 
The loadings of the items on the two promax-rotated factors are shown in Table A.1. The first 
factor was defined by items associated with perceptions of risk relating to the safety of fracking, 
government regulation preferences, and effects on climate change and the environment. 
Therefore, the first factor reflected (lower) risk perception attitudes toward fracking. The second 
factor was defined by items related to the impact of fracking on the economy, including job 
creation (and one negatively loading item about science and technology). Therefore, the second 
factor primarily reflected financially-relevant attitudes toward fracking. Two items, “There has 
been a negative impact on all communities located close to hydraulic fracturing drill sites” and 




“Hydraulic fracking for shale gas has similar effects on the environment as other energy sources, 
such as coal or oil”, did not load onto either of the two factors and were therefore dropped. The 
item “Current environmental problems associated with hydraulic fracturing will never be 
resolved through improvements in science and technology” was also dropped as it showed a 
weak loading on the financial factor but its face validity was low. Finally, the item “Hydraulic 
fracturing for shale gas is essential for the United States to meet its future energy needs” was 
also dropped; although it showed a strong loading on the first factor, its face validity was less 
consistent with perceptions of risk. The two factors were moderately correlated (r=.51). Two 
scales were created. The fracking risk perception attitudes scale was computed by averaging 
the remaining 10 items loading onto the first factor (α=.80). Relevant items were reverse-keyed 
so that higher scores indicated greater risk perceptions. The fracking economic attitudes scale 
was computed by averaging the remaining 6 items loading onto the second factor (α=.79). 
Relevant items were reverse-keyed so that higher scores indicated more favourable attitudes 
about the economic benefits of fracking.   
3.3 Correlations with Ideology and Basic Fracking Knowledge 
 Political conservatism and knowledge about fracking were uncorrelated. Political 
conservatism and basic fracking knowledge were related to many of the study variables, but in 
opposing directions (see Table A.2). Political conservatism related to lower fracking risk 
perception attitudes, whereas knowledge related to higher fracking risk perception attitudes. 
Political conservatism related to more favourable attitudes about the economic benefits of 
fracking; knowledge was unrelated to economic fracking attitudes. Political conservatism related 
to a desire to increase (vs. decrease) the U.S.’ energy reliance on coal, fracking, and natural gas, 
and a desire to decrease reliance on wind, solar and hydroelectric. In contrast, the more 




knowledgeable participants were about the basic components of fracking, the greater their desire 
to decrease reliance on coal and fracking, and increase reliance on wind and solar. Political 
conservatism related to greater distrust of information from environmental organizations, 
consumer protection organizations, colleges or universities, and government agencies, and 
greater trust of industrial or trade organisations. Basic fracking knowledge related only to distrust 
of industrial or trade organisations. Finally, political conservatism related to greater willingness 
to live closer to fracking, coal and nuclear sites, but less willingness to live closer to wind 
turbines. Conversely, greater basic fracking knowledge related to less willingness to live closer 
to fracking, coal and nuclear sites, and greater willingness to live close to wind turbines.  
3.4 Predictive Effects: Political ideology, basic fracking knowledge and their interaction 
 To test the relative predictive effects of political ideology and basic fracking knowledge, 
and whether knowledge moderated the relations between political ideology and attitudes, 
multiple regressions were conducted on each of the attitude variables using SPSS software. 
Political ideology and basic fracking knowledge were standardised and the standardised scores 
were used to create the interaction term. Significant interactions were probed using simple slope 
analyses and probed at 1SD above and 1SD below the mean on basic fracking knowledge (Aiken 
& West, 1991). Results are shown in Table A.3. (Multiple regression analyses were also run with 
age, sex, income, and level of education as covariates. The covariates generally were not 
significant. Importantly, the pattern and significance of the effects of political conservatism, 
basic fracking knowledge, and their interaction were identical whether the covariates were 
included or not. For brevity, we report the analyses without the covariates. Full details of the 
findings for the covariates are available from the first author.) 




 3.4.1 Fracking risk perception attitudes. Political conservatism and basic fracking 
knowledge exerted unique effects on fracking attitudes: Whereas political conservatism predicted 
lower risk perceptions of fracking, greater basic fracking knowledge predicted greater risk 
perceptions. The interaction was significant: The relation between political conservatism and 
fracking risk perception attitudes was significant; however, the magnitude of the relation was 
stronger among participants with greater (b=-.40, p<.001) than lesser (b=-.24, p<.001) basic 
knowledge about fracking (see Figure A.4).  
 3.4.2 Fracking economic attitudes. Political conservatism predicted more favourable 
attitudes about the economic benefits of fracking. Basic fracking knowledge was not a significant 
predictor. The interaction was significant: The relation between political conservatism and 
economic fracking attitudes was significant among those with greater basic fracking knowledge 
(b=.19, p<.001), but not among those with lesser (b=.05, p=.211) knowledge. 
 3.4.3 Energy use attitudes. The pattern of results for energy use of coal and fracking 
attitudes was the same: Political conservatism predicted a desire to increase reliance on coal and 
fracking, whereas greater basic fracking knowledge predicted a desire to decrease reliance on 
coal and fracking. The interactions were not significant. Desire to increase reliance on natural 
gas was also predicted by greater political conservatism; however, basic fracking knowledge was 
not a significant predictor. The interaction for predicting natural gas was also significant, such 
that political conservatism related to a desire to increase reliance on natural gas only among 
those higher in basic fracking knowledge (b=-.24, p<.001), but not lower (b=-.01, p=.772).  
The pattern of results was the same for energy use of wind and solar attitudes: Political 
conservatism predicted a desire to decrease reliance on wind and solar, whereas greater 
knowledge predicted a desire to increase reliance on wind and solar. The interactions for wind 




and solar were also significant (see Figure A.5). The links between political conservatism and a 
desire to decrease reliance on wind and solar were only significant among individuals with lesser 
basic knowledge about fracking (b=.13; b=.11, ps<.001, respectively); the relations were non-
significant among those with greater knowledge (b=.05, p=.081; b=.03, p=.240, respectively). 
Desire to decrease reliance on hydroelectric was only significantly predicted by greater 
conservatism; the effect of knowledge was marginally significant, and the interaction was not 
significant.  
 3.3.4 Distrust of authorities. Political conservatism predicted greater distrust of 
information from environmental organisations, consumer protection organisations, colleges and 
universities, and government agencies, and greater trust of information from industry and trade 
organisations. Basic fracking knowledge only significantly predicted greater distrust of industry 
and trade organizations. The interaction was only significant for government agencies, such that 
greater conservatism related to distrust of government agencies among individuals with greater 
knowledge (b=.16, p=003) but not lesser knowledge (b=.00, p=.990) (see Figure A.6).   
 3.3.5 Distance from energy sources. Greater political conservatism predicted greater 
willingness to live closer to a fracking site, coal mining, and nuclear plant, but less willingness to 
live near a wind turbine. Conversely, greater basic fracking knowledge predicted less willingness 
to live close to fracking, coal, and nuclear power plants, and greater willingness to live closer to 
wind turbines. The interactions were not significant.  
4. Discussion 
 Hydraulic fracturing is proving to be a highly divisive issue, with governments and 
citizens divided on their attitudes towards its usage and impact. Identifying the underpinnings of 
attitudes toward hydraulic fracturing will advance current understanding of this contentious 




issue. Hence, in the present research we investigated the influence of political ideology and 
knowledge about fracking. Our findings revealed that political ideology plays a primary role, 
consistent with other research showing that attitudes toward energy sources are allied to politics 
(Boudet et al., 2014; Davis & Fisk, 2014; Karlstrom & Ryghaug, 2014; Kovacs et al., 2010; 
O’Hara et al., 2014; see Kester et al., 2015 for a discussion). As the first investigation to examine 
objective knowledge (vs. familiarity), our data clearly reveal that basic knowledge about fracking 
is important for understanding fracking and other energy source attitudes, and that basic 
knowledge can affect the relation between ideology and attitudes.  
Individuals identifying as politically conservative (vs. liberal) perceived fracking as less 
risky and as presenting more economic benefits (Hypothesis 1a), as predicted. That is, 
conservatives underestimated the risks and overestimated the benefits. These relations are 
consistent with other research showing that political conservatives are more favourable toward 
fracking (Boudet et al., 2014; Davis & Fisk, 2014; Kester et al., 2015; O’Hara et al., 2014; PEW 
Research, 2011, 2014), and that political conservatives perceive traditional energy sources as less 
risky (e.g., Choma et al., 2013). Many traditional energy sources, including fracking, present 
considerable economic benefits. Thus, it is not surprising that conservatives, who value business 
and industry generally (Kerlinger, 1984), also perceive fracking as particularly advantageous.  
 A clear ideological divide also emerged with respect to preferences for reliance on 
specific energy sources and preferred dwelling distance from energy operations. Political 
conservatives indicated a greater desire to increase reliance on traditional energy sources, 
including fracking, coal, and natural gas, and a desire to decrease reliance on renewable energy 
sources, specifically, wind, solar, and hydroelectric (Hypothesis 2a). Those higher in political 
conservatism (vs. liberalism) were also more willing to live closer to traditional energy source 




operations, but less willing to live close to wind turbines (Hypothesis 4a) – despite the 
heightened objective risk associated with fracking, coal, and natural gas. These associations 
imply that fracking risk perceptions, preferences for energy reliance, and preferred dwelling 
distance from energy operations are driven by ideology rather than objective assessments of 
potential harm. Indeed, these patterns of relations reflect core differences between conservatives 
and liberals, in that conservatives favour the status quo and liberals opt for change (Jost et al., 
2003, 2008). Lower risk perception is associated with engaging in and endorsing relevant 
behaviours (Hanoch et al., 2006; Slovic, 1987); for example, perceiving nuclear as less risky is 
linked with support for nuclear power (Visschers & Siegris, 2013). Our findings extend this 
literature showing that conservatives (vs. liberals) were more supportive of and more willing to 
live closer to fracking – an energy source they perceived of as less risky.   
 Political conservatives were more trusting of industry and trade organisations, whereas 
liberals were more trusting of environmental organisations, consumer protection organisations, 
colleges/universities, and government agencies (Hypothesis 3a). That is, both conservatives and 
liberals were more trusting of entities espousing information consistent with their opinions and 
fundamental ideological characteristics (see also Gauchet, 2012; Keele, 2005; Michaud et al., 
2008): Conservatives trusted entities in support of business, industry, and traditional energy 
sources, and liberals trusted (a Democratic) government, and scientific (college/university) and 
environmental entities highlighting the negative effects of traditional energy sources and benefits 
of alternative and greener energy sources. Therefore, trust appears to have little to do with the 
pedigree or self-interest of the information source, and more to do with ones’ ideological stance.  
 We also explored the impact of objective knowledge, specifically, participants basic 
knowledge (vs. familiarity) about fracking such as identifying correct definitions of shale gas, 




hydraulic fracturing, fracking fluid, etc. Unlike political ideology, basic fracking knowledge was 
unrelated to fracking economic attitudes, reliance on natural gas and hydroelectric sources, and 
trust (except industry/trade). The relations between knowledge and the remaining dependent 
measures were in opposing directions than those reported for political conservatism (vs. 
liberalism). Greater basic knowledge about fracking was related to greater risk perceptions, 
preferred decreased reliance on fracking and coal, preferred increased reliance on wind and solar, 
greater distrust of industry and trade organisations, less willingness to live close to fracking, 
coal, and nuclear operations, and greater willingness to live closer to wind turbines. These 
findings are consistent with previous research showing that familiarity with fracking related to 
less favourable attitudes of fracking (Boudet et al., 2014).  
In general, political ideology related to more energy source attitudes than basic 
knowledge about fracking. In addition, the relations with political ideology were stronger in 
magnitude than those with basic fracking knowledge, with the exception of preferred distance 
from wind (basic knowledge was a stronger predictor) and preferred distance from nuclear (the 
magnitude was equivalent). Thus, our findings provide preliminary evidence that political 
ideology compared to basic knowledge about fracking is more central in predicting fracking risk 
perception and other energy source attitudes.  
 Basic fracking knowledge also affected the nature of the relation between political 
ideology and attitudes. For fracking risk perception attitudes, the relation between political 
conservatism (vs. liberalism) and lower risk perception was stronger among those who knew 
more (vs. less) about the basic components of fracking. Hence, even though knowledge predicted 
greater risk perception, it served to strengthen conservatives’ belief that fracking does not 
present risks. The links between political ideology and fracking economic attitudes, reliance on 




natural gas, and distrust of government agencies were only significant among participants who 
demonstrated greater basic knowledge about fracking such that political conservatives (vs. 
liberals) believed fracking presented more economic benefits, desired to increase reliance on 
natural gas, and held greater distrust of government agencies. Hence, for the issues consistent 
with conservatives’ general ideological preferences, knowledge served to strengthen relations. 
These findings extend other research showing that knowledge can have opposing effects for 
conservatives and liberals (Hamilton, 2011; McCright & Dunlap, 2011). The links between 
political conservatism (vs. liberalism) with desire to decrease reliance on wind and solar was 
only significant among those with poorer knowledge. Therefore, for issues consistent with 
liberals’ ideological proclivities, the effect of ideology was only relevant for those with poorer 
knowledge. In other words, it seemed that for these issues, people were more likely to rely on 
ideological scripts of what they should or should not support or oppose in the absence of 
objective knowledge. Therefore, the moderating effect of knowledge was far more complex than 
we proposed. Further, while our research indicates that basic fracking knowledge is relevant for 
fracking attitudes and other energy source attitudes, it is unclear why that it is, specifically. 
Future researchers might explore possible mechanisms for the role of knowledge. 
The present results should be considered in light of some limitations. First, we relied on 
American women and men of a range of ages, education backgrounds, and incomes; our sample 
was recruited using MTurk, an increasingly popular recruitment tool for social scientists that 
offers more representative samples than undergraduate participants, but is nevertheless not a 
random or representative sample of the U.S. population. As such, this limitation should be 
considered when interpreting these results. Second, participants’ geographic location within the 
U.S. was not assessed. It is possible that living closer or further from fracking sites may impact 




participant’s attitudes toward fracking and the nature of the findings uncovered here. For 
example, it is possible that living closer to fracking sites may strengthen the relations noted in 
the present research; future research is needed to address this possibility. Finally, basic fracking 
knowledge was conceptualised as a predictor of fracking risk perceptions. Perceiving fracking as 
risky, however, might also foster a desire to learn more about fracking. Future research is needed 
to explore the causal connection between knowledge and fracking risk perceptions.  
4.1 Conclusion  
Historically, Democrats and Republicans have not always been on opposing sides when it 
comes to environmental protection. Dunlap and McCright (2008), for example, remind us, that 
under the tenure of Franklin Roosevelt and Richard Nixon important and swiping environmental 
protection legislations were enacted. Our work, in contrast, provides additional indications that 
the gap between the two political groups has widened, at least with respect to fracking. One 
might wonder, therefore, how this work can inform policy makers, scientists and stakeholders. 
As we noted in our Introduction, different factors drive the discussion with regards to fracking. 
While some—such as the Governor of Texas—focus on the economics benefits, others—such as 
the German government—highlight the possible risks. The first implication of our results is the 
need to tailor information to different ideological groups. While Democrats tend to focus on the 
environmental and health risks associated with fracking, Republicans are more geared towards 
the financial benefits. Thus, providing Democrats with information about the financial benefits is 
unlikely to sway their attitudes, and likewise providing Republicans with more data about the 
risks will do little to change their minds.  
Second, advocates of renewable energies—such as wind—need to improve social 
acceptance among Republicans and be better informed about their objections and reservations to 




installing wind turbines—as illustrated in our findings showing Republicans worried about living 
close to wind turbines. To do so, it will probably require a leading Republican politician—as 
were Nixon and Roosevelt—to take a stand (for a similar line of argument see, Unsworth & 
Fielding, 2014). Republicans also tend to trust industry, and as such it is possible that companies 
involved in renewable energy might be well positioned to promulgate information.  
Third, there is a need to improve knowledge among all individuals, a role that scientists 
and other stakeholders could assume. Indeed, Boudet et al. (2014) argued for the need to educate 
individuals about the broader implications of fracking, such as the social, health, economic, and 
environmental implications. The work presented here provides key insights as to how political 
affiliation affects attitudes towards fracking, as well as the need to further understand the link 
between basic knowledge and the formation of attitudes on such key matters. By better 
understanding the sources of information people draw on, and their attitudes towards fracking, 
the present research could help address, and possibly reduce, some of the political divisions that 
exist about fracking. 
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Results of the common factor analysis on the fracking attitudes scale  
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
The methods used in hydraulic fracturing for shale gas are considered absolutely safe.  .92 -.20 
People would be much better off if there were fewer government regulations on hydraulic 
fracturing companies. 
 .83 -.26 
Hydraulic fracturing for shale gas will help slow down climate change.  .81 -.03 
Hydraulic fracturing companies work hard to make sure that they take care of the 
environment. 
 .81 -.00 
Hydraulic fracturing for shale gas is essential for the United States to meet its future energy 
needs. 
 .67  .26 
Hydraulic fracturing for shale gas produces a “greener” fuel than other sources, such as 
coal or oil. 
 .67  .18 
Hydraulic fracturing for shale gas will have a negative impact on the environment. (R) -.66  .04 
Shale gas can be removed from the earth through fracking with minimal environmental 
damage, if done correctly. 
 .66  .21 
Hydraulic fracturing for shale gas is dangerous. (R) -.59 -.00 
The government should impose much stricter regulations on hydraulic fracturing 
companies.(R) 
-.49  .01 
Hydraulic fracturing for shale gas will have no effect on the progress of climate change.  .49  -.05 
Hydraulic fracturing for shale gas will have a negative impact on the U.S. economy. (R)  .18 -.79 
Hydraulic fracturing will not help create jobs in local communities close to drill sites. (R)  .31 -.77 
Hydraulic fracturing for shale gas extraction will help create jobs locally and nationally.  .07  .72 
Hydraulic fracturing for shale gas will be financially beneficial for the United States.  .17  .65 
Hydraulic fracturing for shale gas in the United States will NOT help the country become 
gas self-sufficient. (R) 
-.03 -.59 
Hydraulic fracturing for shale gas will allow the United States to become self-sufficient in 
gas. 
 .45  .48 
Current environmental problems associated with hydraulic fracturing will never be resolved 
through improvements in science and technology.  
 .08 -.33 
There has been a negative impact on all communities located close to hydraulic fracturing 
drill sites. (R) 
-.26 -.22 
Hydraulic fracturing for shale gas has similar effects on the environment as other energy 
sources, such as coal or oil. (R) 
 .06  .01 
Note. N=412. Loadings are pattern loadings in a promax-rotated solution (kappa=4). 










Basic fracking knowledge 
 
Political Conservatism  4.72 (2.76) -- -.04 
Basic fracking knowledge 2.78 (0.97) -.04 -- 
Fracking Risk Perception Attitudes 3.63 (0.79) -.41**  .29** 
Fracking Economic Attitudes 2.30 (0.65)  .18**  .06 
Energy use of: fracking 2.44 (0.73) -.29**  .15** 
                        coal 2.51 (0.66) -.34**  .25** 
                        natural gas 1.91 (0.71) -.18**  .04 
                        wind 1.13 (0.40)  .22** -.23** 
                        solar 1.09 (0.35)  .21** -.23** 
                        hydroelectric 1.29 (0.53)  .16** -.09 
Distrust of: EN-OR 2.21 (0.73)  .33*  .02 
                   CPO 2.22 (0.68)  .22** -.06 
                   colleges or universities 2.05 (0.65)  .11* -.05 
                   government agencies 2.78 (0.79)  .10* -.07 
                   IN/Trade O 3.06 (0.74) -.24**  .15** 
Distance from: fracking 5.86 (1.41) -.28**  .16** 
                    coal 5.95 (1.25) -.24**  .16** 
                    nuclear 6.22 (1.12) -.10*  .10* 
                    wind 3.69 (1.66)  .15** -.17** 
Note. N=412 (except N=403 for fracking economic attitudes). **p<.010. *p<.05. 





Regression results: Unstandardized coefficients 
 Political Conservatism Definition Knowledge PC x DK  
 B sr2 B sr2 B sr2 R2 
Fracking risk perception attitudes -.32** .16  .22** .08 -.08* .01 .26 
Fracking economic attitudes  .12** .03  .04 .00  .07* .01 .05 
Energy use of: coal -.22** .11  .16** .06 -.00 .00 .17 
                        fracking -.21** .08  .10** .02 -.02 .00 .10 
                        wind  .09** .05 -.09** .05 -.04* .01 .11 
                        solar  .07** .04 -.08** .05 -.04** .02 .11 
                        hydroelectric  .08** .02 -.05 .01 -.01 .00 .03 
                        natural gas -.13** .03  .02 .00 -.11** .03 .06 
Distrust of: EN-OR  .24** .11  .03 .00  .06 .01 .11 
                   CPO  .14** .04 -.04 .00  .05 .00 .05 
                   IN/Trade O -.17** .05  .11** .02 -.01 .00 .07 
                   colleges or universities  .08* .01 -.03 .00  .03 .00 .02 
                   government agencies  .08* .01 -.05 .00  .08* .01 .03 
Distance from: fracking -.39** .08  .21** .02 -.04 .00 .10 
                    wind  .23** .02 -.29** .03  .05 .00 .05 
                    coal -.29** .06  .19** .02  .02 .00 .08 
                    nuclear -.12* .01  .12* .01  .09 .00 .03 
Note. **p<.010. *p<.05. N=412, except solar/hydroelectric, n=411.  





Interaction between political conservatism and basic fracking knowledge predicting fracking risk 
perception attitudes 
 











Interaction between political conservatism and basic fracking knowledge predicting energy 
reliance on solar 
 
Note. The same pattern emerged for reliance on wind. Slopes were plotted at 1SD above and 


















Interaction between political conservatism and basic fracking knowledge predicting distrust of 
government agencies 
 
Note. Slopes were plotted at 1SD above and below the mean on basic fracking knowledge.  
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